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Abstract
Background: In the 2003 Toronto SARS outbreak, SARS-CoV was transmitted in hospitals despite adherence to infection
control procedures. Considerable controversy resulted regarding which procedures and behaviours were associated with
the greatest risk of SARS-CoV transmission.
Methods: A retrospective cohort study was conducted to identify risk factors for transmission of SARS-CoV during
intubation from laboratory confirmed SARS patients to HCWs involved in their care. All SARS patients requiring intubation
during the Toronto outbreak were identified. All HCWs who provided care to intubated SARS patients during treatment or
transportation and who entered a patient room or had direct patient contact from 24 hours before to 4 hours after
intubation were eligible for this study. Data was collected on patients by chart review and on HCWs by interviewer-
administered questionnaire. Generalized estimating equation (GEE) logistic regression models and classification and
regression trees (CART) were used to identify risk factors for SARS transmission.
Results: 45 laboratory-confirmed intubated SARS patients were identified. Of the 697 HCWs involved in their care, 624 (90%)
participated in the study. SARS-CoV was transmitted to 26 HCWs from 7 patients; 21 HCWs were infected by 3 patients. In
multivariate GEE logistic regression models, presence in the room during fiberoptic intubation (OR=2.79, p=.004) or ECG
(OR=3.52, p=.002), unprotected eye contact with secretions (OR=7.34, p=.001), patient APACHE II score $20 (OR=17.05,
p=.009) and patient Pa02/Fi02 ratio #59 (OR=8.65, p=.001) were associated with increased risk of transmission of SARS-
CoV. In CART analyses, the four covariates which explained the greatest amount of variation in SARS-CoV transmission were
covariates representing individual patients.
Conclusion: Close contact with the airway of severely ill patients and failure of infection control practices to prevent
exposure to respiratory secretions were associated with transmission of SARS-CoV. Rates of transmission of SARS-CoV varied
widely among patients.
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Introduction
On March 7, 2003, a son of Canada’s index SARS case was
admitted to a hospital in Toronto with a diagnosis of community-
acquired pneumonia. Because he and other family members were
not identified as infected with SARS CoV until March 13,
infection was transmitted to patients, volunteers, visitors and
health care workers in this community hospital, and subsequently
in other hospitals and the community throughout Greater Toronto
Area (GTA). Over the next three months, SARS-CoV would be
transmitted to 375 persons in Toronto, 271 (72%) of whom
acquired their infections in health care settings.[1–3] The
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10717healthcare workers at greatest risk of acquiring SARS were those
caring for critically ill SARS patients, and transmission was
documented despite the use of recommended personal protective
equipment. [3–7]
During and after the outbreak, considerable controversy
evolved regarding how HCWs using precautions became infected,
and what care activities and/or behaviours posed the greatest risk
of transmission. We conducted a retrospective cohort study
designed to identify risk factors associated with transmission of
SARS-CoV from patients requiring intubation to HCWs involved
in their care. In particular, we wanted to assess the risk of SARS-
CoV transmission associated with adherence to infection control
precautions and with performance of ‘‘high-risk’’ procedures in a
setting in which adjustment for potential patient-related charac-
teristics was possible.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Patient clinical details were obtained through review of health
records which was conducted for a study of clinical presentation
and management of SARS. The study was approved by the IRB of
each hospital where patients were treated. Individual consents
were not obtained which is the practice for chart review studies in
which individual patient identifying information is not required.
All patients in the SARS outbreak were given a unique identifying
number and all data were coded with this unique number. There
was no information collected that could identify the patient
personally.
HCWs blood samples were obtained through a seroprevalence
study, which was part of the public health investigation and
received IRB approval at each hospital where HCWs were
enrolled. HCWs provided consent for blood samples.
Approvals for both studies were obtained from The Mount
Sinai Hospital Research Ethics Board as well as the Research
Ethics Boards/Committees of the following institutions: Sunny-
brook Health Center. North York General Hospital, The
Scarborough Hospital, Rouge Valley Health Care, Humber River
Regional Hospital, Markham Stuffily Hospital, St. Michael’s
Hospital, St. Joseph’s Health Center, Southlake Regional Health
Center, Toronto East General Hospital, University Health Center,
and Lakeridge Health Center.
HCWs were interviewed as part of a public health investigation
into the transmission of SARS-CoV. HCWs were invited to
participate and consent was implied by willingness of HCWs to be
interviewed about their experiences. No IRB approval was
required as these interviews occurred as part of the public health
outbreak investigation which is a legislated responsibility of the
Ontario public health units.
Identification and Classification of Patients and HCWs
Patients. SARS patients requiring intubation were identified
by reviewing outbreak line lists from the Province of Ontario, local
public health units, and hospitals. All cases in the Toronto outbreak
who met the clinical and epidemiologic criteria for SARS [8] and
who required intubation were included. Clinical criteria for
SARS included fever .38uC, one or more respiratory symptoms,
radiological evidence of pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome
and no alternative diagnosis; or having an unexplained acute
respiratory illness resulting in death between March 5, 2003 and
June 12, 2003. [8] Epidemiological criteria included: visiting a
setting that was associated with a SARS cluster or having cared for,
lived with or had face-to-face contact with a person known to have
SARS in the 10 days prior to onset of symptoms.
All patients in whom SARS was suspected had multiple clinical
specimens tested by culture and PCR for SARS-CoV, including
nasal swabs, nasopharyngeal swabs, throat swabs, sputum/endotra-
cheal secretions, conjunctival swabs, stool, urine and, if available,
bronchoalveolar lavage and post-mortem lung and other tissue
samples. [9] If possible, acute and convalescent serum were also
obtained. Patients were classified as laboratory confirmed, probable,
unclassifiable or not a case of SARS-associated coronavirus (CoV)
disease, based on laboratory testing. Laboratory confirmed cases
were those with SARS-CoV antibodies detected in serum obtained
after the onset of symptoms by tests conducted in two different
reference laboratories, SARS CoV isolated by cell culture from a
clinical and/or autopsy specimen, SARS-CoV RNA detected by
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) from an
autopsy specimen with compatible histological findings, or SARS-
CoV RNA detected by RT-PCR from at least two different
specimens by two different reference laboratories. [9] Probable cases
were those in whom a convalescent serum specimen was not
available for testing and other laboratory criteria for SARS were not
met, but who had clinically compatible disease and at least one
household contact who was a laboratory confirmed case of SARS.
Cases were unclassifiable if they did not meet criteria for laboratory
confirmed disease, and either had no household contacts, or contacts
without laboratory confirmed disease. Patients were classified as not
having SARS if antibodies to SARS-CoV could not be detected in
serum obtained more than 28 days after symptom onset.
HCWs. All HCWs who provided care to intubated SARS
patients during treatment or transportation, or who entered the
room of such patients from 24 hours prior to intubation until
4 hours after intubation were eligible for this study, and
approached for consent to participate. They were identified by
review of patient charts, work schedules, assignments and on-call
schedules, and by asking individuals being interviewed to recall
which other staff members were present.
We reviewed outbreak line lists and interviewed HCWs to
identify those with fever or respiratory symptoms with onset from
1 to 14 days after each work shift with identified patients.
Participating HCWs were also asked to submit a convalescent
serum sample for SARS-CoV antibody testing. HCWs were
classified as SARS if they had antibodies to SARS-CoV detected
in their convalescent serum, or if they met the SARS outbreak case
definition [8] and did not have serology performed. They were
classified as not having SARS if they had negative serology or if
they did not have serology done and had no fever or respiratory
symptoms. They were deemed unclassifiable if they had SARS
compatible symptoms that did not meet the case definition and
convalescent serology was not available.
Staff were asked about their history of travel to areas affected by
SARS, care provided to any possible SARS patients, and
household and other contact with potential SARS cases, including
other HCWs. For symptomatic HCWs, we recorded potential
exposures in the period from 24 hours to 12 days before onset of
illness using outbreak contact tracing data, interviews and work
assignments. For HCWs who were SARS-CoV seropositive
without symptoms, we reviewed all potential exposures which
occurred during the outbreak period.
A high risk exposure to SARS was defined as being in the same
room as or involved in the transport of a SARS patient either
during the 24 hours prior to the patient requiring intubation, or at
any time when adequate precautions had not been implemented.
Adequate precautions were defined as the patient being in a
negative pressure room and gown, gloves, mask (surgical mask or,
N95 or higher respirator) and eye protection (goggles, safety
glasses or face shield) being worn.
Risk Factors for SARS
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patients with laboratory-confirmed SARS, and HCWs who were
either asymptomatic or had laboratory confirmed disease and
whose only high risk exposure was contact with intubated patients.
A secondary analysis included probable and laboratory confirmed
SARS patients and all infected HCWs. Because there were no
significant differences between the two analyses, only the results of
the primary analysis are presented here.
Measurements
Patients. A standardized data collection form was used for
chart review, and included: age, sex, underlying chronic conditions,
date of symptom onset, duration of illness at the time of intubation,
date of hospital and ICU admission, date of discharge, outcome;
documented vomiting, diarrhea, incontinence, agitation, and
combativeness during the 24 hours prior to intubation, acute
physiology and chronic health evaluation II score during the same
period (APACHE II) [10], lowest PaO2 to FiO2 (P/F ratio) ratio
during the first 24 hours in the ICU and maximum inspired oxygen
requirement (FiO2) on the second day of hospital admission. We also
recorded whether attending physicians suspected that the patient
had SARS at the time of intubation.
Details of the intubation procedures were obtained from
medical records and interviews with the staff member who
performed the intubation. These included: method of intubation
(fiber optic, laryngoscopic, nasopharyngeal, or tracheotomy),
patient combativeness, number of attempts required, experience
of person performing the procedure, and whether manual
intubation was required before and/or after intubation. Intuba-
tions were classified as difficult if more than one attempt was
required, if fiber optic visualization or any adjuvant device for
difficult airway was required, or if the patient was combative.
HCWs performing intubations were considered experienced if
they had more than three years of experience and performed more
than one intubation per month, or if they had more than one year
of experience and performed more than one intubation per week.
Procedures and activities performed during the defined
exposure period were documented. These included: airway
management procedures (oxygen therapy, bronchoscopy, non-
invasive positive pressure ventilation, manual ventilation, suction-
ing, type of mechanical ventilation, nebulizer treatment) and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation and defibrillation and other care
activities (chest x-ray; electrocardiogram; chest tube insertion;
insertion of central venous, peripheral or arterial catheters;
insertion of urinary catheter or nasogastric tube; collection of
blood, urine, stool, or sputum samples).
HCWs. A structured questionnaire was administered to
HCWs through a face-to-face interview or by telephone
interview if a respondent was in quarantine or had left their job.
HCWs were asked about occupation, years of experience in their
current occupation, age, sex, history of smoking and underlying
chronic conditions.
All non-demographic variables were assessed separately for each
eligible shift. An eligible shift was defined as one in which a HCW
provided care for one patient during that patient’s defined
exposure period. When HCWs worked two shifts during one
exposure period, data from these two shifts were combined for the
analysis.
For each shift, questions were asked about the number of room
entries, cumulative time spent in a patient room, and type and
duration of contact with a patient. We also assessed level of
involvement (performed, assisted or observed) in and the amount
of time the HCW spent in the patient’s room during 34 patient
care activities, as well as the HCW’s presence in the patient’s room
while the patient was receiving non-invasive ventilation, oxygen
therapy, and mechanical ventilation. Copies of charts were
provided to interviewees to assist in recall.
Type of personal protection equipment (PPE) -gloves, gown,
goggles or face shield, surgical mask, N95 or higher respirator,
and frequency of its use (never, sometimes, most of the time
and always) during the shift were assessed. We also asked
about PPE use separately during involvement in patient care
activities and categorized HCWs’ sequence of removal of PPE
based on the potential risk of self-contamination of mucous
membranes. [11]
Participants were asked whether they had received SARS-
specific infection control training prior to their eligible shift.
Infection control training was categorized as active (face-to-face
teaching) or passive (written instructions only). Exposure incidents
that occurred during the eligible shift were recorded, including
needle stick injuries and exposure of skin or mucous membranes to
patient’s body fluids, blood, secretions or mucous membranes.
Laboratory tests. Laboratory testing was conducted in
collaboration with the Ontario Laboratory Working Group for
the Rapid Diagnosis of Emerging Diseases, the Central Ontario
Public Health Laboratory, the SARS autopsy investigation, the
British Columbia Centre for Disease Control, and the Canadian
National Microbiology Laboratory. Detection of IgG antibody to
SARS-CoV was performed by using an enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or immunofluorescent assay (IFA)
as previously described. [9]
Statistical Methods
Demographic and clinical characteristics were summarized with
counts and percentages for categorical variables and with medians
and interquartile ranges for ordinal and continuous variables.
These characteristics were compared between patients who did
and did not transmit SARS-CoV and between HCWs who did
and did not develop SARS with chi square or Fisher’s exact tests
for categorical variables and Wilcoxon rank sum tests for ordinal
and continuous variables.
Two statistical methods were used to identify factors associated
with SARS-CoV transmission: Classification and regression trees
(CART) [12] and Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) models.
[13] CART is a non-parametric method of identifying predictor
variables by using binary recursive partitioning: subsets of patients
are formed by examining each possible cut point of each variable
to identify the cut point that resulted in maximum discrimination
between subgroups of patients with respect to the probability of
acquiring SARS. CART analyses were conducted twice: with and
without allowing patient specific covariates to be predictor
variables.
GEE logistic regression models were used to identify predictor
variables while adjusting for correlation among responses from
HCWs caring for the same patient. Correlation within HCW shifts
caring for a single patient was assumed to follow the exchangeable
correlation structure. Correlation among shifts worked by the
same HCW was not modeled. Covariates which had a p value
,0.10 in univariate GEE logistic regression models were
considered as candidates for entry into the multivariable GEE
model.
Results
Fifty-six (15%) of 360 SARS patients who received treatment in
one of 20 Ontario hospitals required intubation. Eleven patients
were excluded from the primary analysis: seven had probable
SARS, one patient was unclassifiable and three patients had at
Risk Factors for SARS
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antibodies to SARS CoV at $28 days after symptom onset. Thus,
45 patients were classified as having laboratory confirmed SARS
and were included in the primary analysis as potential index cases
for the exposed HCWs.
Overall, 624 (90%) of 697 HCWs who were identified as having
provided care to the 45 laboratory confirmed SARS patients
consented to participate, could be classified as having had SARS
or not, and had no other high risk exposures. They worked a total
of 786 eligible shifts. Interviews were completed at a median of 4.2
months (range 0.2–10 months) after the eligible shift. 111 (17.8%)
HCWs were involved in the care of more than one intubated
SARS patient, with a maximum of 8 eligible patients cared for by
the same HCW. The median number of participating HCWs
involved in the care of each SARS patient during the relevant time
period (24 hours prior to intubation until 4 hours post-intubation)
was 15 (range 6 to 30).
Of the 624 participating HCWs, 26 contracted SARS; all
survived and none required intubation. SARS-CoV transmission
to HCWs was attributable to 7 of the 45 laboratory confirmed
SARS patients. Transmission to 22 HCWs could be definitively
attributed to a single patient, with 6 patients transmitting to 1, 1, 2,
5, 6 and 7 HCWs respectively. The remaining four HCWs who
acquired SARS had cared for more than one SARS patient during
the high risk period, making it difficult to precisely identify which
patient was the source of infection. For the primary analysis, we
assumed a ‘most likely scenario’ for assigning transmission to one
patient. Three of the infected staff members cared for two patients
whose intubations were a few hours apart. Since one patient was
the source of infection for five other individuals; we assumed in the
primary analysis that this patient had also transmitted SARS-CoV
to these 3 HCWs. The fourth HCW was involved in the care of
two intubated patients; transmission was assumed to have
occurred on the shift that involved emergency intubation and
cardiac resuscitation.
No patient characteristics were statistically significantly different
between patients who did and did not transmit SARS-CoV
(Table 1). HCWs who contracted SARS were more likely to be
paramedics (p,.01) and had less infection control training
(p,.009) than other workers (Table 2). They were less likely to
always wear goggles (p,0.01) or a gown (p=.02) while in the
patient’s room, and more likely to have used less effective methods
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of SARS patients requiring intubation in the Toronto outbreak by presence or
absence of transmission to HCWs.
No Transmission of
SARS to HCWs N=38
SARS Transmission to
at least one HCW N=7 p value All N=45
Patient Characteristics at Admission
Age, years
a 59 (45, 72) 63 (47, 75) 0.64 61 (47, 72)
Sex, number (%) male 17(45%) 5 (71%) 0.24
b 22 (49%)
Chronic underlying illness
c 15(39%) 3(43%) 0.99
b 18 (40%)
Diabetes 12(32%) 3(43%) 0.67
b 15(33%)
Immunosuppression 3(8%) 1(14%) 0.50
b 4(9%)
PaO2/FiO2 ratio
a 84 (67, 116) 85 (51, 112) 0.64 84 (59, 112)
FiO2 on day 2 of hospitalization
a 0.38 (0, 0.95) 0.4 (0, 1) 0.78 0.4 (0, 0.95)
Apache II score (1
st 24 h ICU)
a 16 (14, 20) 21 (11, 22) 0.20 16 (14,21)
Patient transmitted SARS prior
d 15(39%) 4(57%) 0.43
b 19 (42%)
Patient Characteristics at Intubation
Day of illness at time of intubation
a 9(7, 13) 7(7, 9) 0.20 9(7, 12)
Diarrhea 24 hours prior to intubation 18(47%) 1(14%) 0.21
b 19 (42%)
Vomiting 24 hours prior to intubation 7(18%) 1(14%) 0.99
b 8(18%)
Copious secretions at intubation 14(37%) 1(14%) 0.40
b 15(33%)
Combative during intubation 7(18%) 1(14%) 0.99
b 8(18%)
Intubated in negative pressure room 33(87%) 6(86%) 0.99
b 39(87%)
Patient recognized as SARS at time of intubation 33 (87%) 6(86%) 0.99
b 39 (87%)
Characteristics of Intubation
Intubation difficult 12(32%) 3(43%) 0.67
b 15(33%)
Intubation performed during night shift 7(18%) 1(14%) 0.99
b 8(18%)
Primary intubator experienced 32(84%) 6(86%) 0.99
b 38(84%)
Intubation emergent 0(0%) 1(14%) 0.16
b 1(2%)
Patient Outcome
Deceased 18 (47%) 5 (71%) 0.40
b 23 (51%)
aValues are given as median (lower quartile, upper quartile).
bFisher’s exact test.
cChronic underlying illness is defined as having one or more of diabetes, chronic renal failure, chronic liver disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary syndrome, coronary
artery disease, congestive heart failure, active cancer, HIV/AIDS, transplantation.
dTransmission occurred from patient to household or hospital contact prior to study period (starting 24 hours prior to intubation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010717.t001
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were more likely to have participated in administering non-
invasive ventilation (p,0.01), and to have performed ECGs
(p,0.01), fiber optic intubation (p,0.01) or manual ventilation
before intubation (p,0.01) than HCWs who did not develop
SARS (Table 3).
In the CART analysis allowing individual patients to be entered
as covariates, patient covariates were the top four splitting
variables according to the deviance at each node (Figure 1).
Twenty-three of the 26 HCWs who acquired SARS were involved
in the care of one of these four patients. The results of this analysis
did not change when only HCWs with exposures to single patients
were considered, or when we altered the assumptions regarding
which patient infected the four HCWs with exposures to two
patients. If patients were not included as predictor variables
(Figure 2), then the first splitting variable was whether the patient
P/F ratio was .35.5 or ,35.5 (3% vs 42% contracted SARS).
Among the 605 HCWs involved in the care of patients with P/F
ratio .35.5, the most predictive variable was whether or not the
HCW wore eye protection (1% of HCWs infected wearing eye
protection vs 8% infected not using eye protection). It should be
noted that the single patient with P/F ratio ,35.5 was the patient
Table 2. Characteristics of health care workers who provided care to intubated SARS patients in Toronto, by SARS acquisition
status.
HCWs who did not
develop SARS N=598
HCWs who developed
SARS N=26 p value All N=624
Age, years
a 40 (34, 48) 38.5 (33, 44) 0.21 40 (34, 47)
Sex, number (%) male 145 (24%) 10 (38%) 0.10 155 (25%)
Had chronic disease
b(N=609) 36 (6%) 1 (4%) 0.99
c 37 (6%)
Position
Staff physician
Medical resident/intern
Registered nurse
Respiratory therapist
Radiology technologist
Housekeeper
Personal service assistant
Laboratory technician/technologist
Paramedic/emergency medical technician
Pharmacist
Ward clerk
Porter
Physiotherapist/occupational therapist
Other
73 (12%)
14 (2%)
272 (45%)
85 (14%)
66 (11%)
38 (6%)
25 (4%)
14 (2%)
0 (0%)
2 (0.3%)
2 (0.3%)
2 (0.3%)
1 (0.2%)
4 (0.7%)
4 (15%)
2 (8%)
11 (42%)
4 (15%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
3 (12%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0.55
c
0.14
c
0.75
0.78
c
0.34
c
0.39
c
0.99
c
0.99
c
,0.01
c
0.99
c
0.99
c
0.99
c
0.99
c
0.99
c
77 (12%)
16 (3%)
283 (45%)
89 (14%)
67 (11%)
38 (6%)
26 (4%)
14 (2%)
3( 0 . 5 % )
2( 0 . 3 % )
2( 0 . 3 % )
2( 0 . 3 % )
1( 0 . 2 % )
4( 0 . 6 % )
Total hours worked in 7 days prior to study period
a (N=565) 37.5(32, 48) (N=545) 40(36, 55) (N=20) 0.15 38(32, 48)
Always wore goggles while in patient room 451(75%) 13(50%) ,0.01 464 (74%)
Always wore gloves while in patient room 555 (93%) 23 (88%) 0.43
c 578 (93%)
Always wore gown while in patient room 541 (90%) 20 (77%) 0.04
c 561 (90%)
Respiratory protection while in patient room
None
Surgical mask
N95 or equivalent
Higher protection than N95
(e.g., N95 plus Stryker hood, PAPRs)
49 (8%)
25 (4%)
496 (83%)
28 (5%)
3 (12%)
5 (19%)
18 (69%)
0 (0%)
0.04
d 52 (8%)
30 (5%)
514 (82%)
28 (4%)
Personal protective equipment removal
e
None used
No hand hygiene performed
No hand hygiene before removing face protection,
hand hygiene at the end
Hand hygiene before removing face protection,
no hand hygiene at the end
Hand hygiene before removing face protection,
plus hand hygiene at the end
41 (7%)
192 (32%)
290 (48%)
14 (2%)
61 (10%)
3 (12%)
11 (42%)
8 (31%)
0 (0%)
4 (15%)
0.56
d 44 (7%)
203 (33%)
298 (48%)
14 (2%)
65 (10%)
Infection control training
None
Other (information from colleagues)
Email or written instructions
Group sessions
Individual face to face instruction
173 (29%)
9 (2%)
136 (23%)
127 (21%)
153 (26%)
16 (62%)
0 (0%)
2 (8%)
2(8%)
6 (23%)
0.009
d 189 (30%)
9 (1%)
138 (22%)
129 (21%)
159 (25%)
aValues are given as median (lower quartile, upper quartile).
bChronic underlying illness is defined as having one or more of diabetes, chronic renal failure, chronic liver disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary syndrome, coronary
artery disease, congestive heart failure, active cancer, HIV/AIDS, transplantation.
cFisher’s exact test.
dCochran-Armitage test for trend.
esee reference 11.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010717.t002
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individual patients included.
In univariate GEE models (Table S1), patient characteristics
associated with transmitting SARS-CoV were: P/F ratio #59,
gender, death due to SARS, APACHE II score $20, presence of
diarrhea within 24 hours of intubation, any chronic underlying
illness disease, and diabetes mellitus (when underlying illnesses
were considered separately). HCW characteristics associated with
acquiring SARS included eye/mucous membrane exposure to
blood/body fluids, performing intubation, and presence in the
room for any of cardiac compressions, defibrillation, ECG,
intubation, manual ventilation, manipulation of oxygen mask or
Table 3. HCW participation in patient care procedures, by SARS acquisition status.
HCWs who did not
develop SARS N=598
HCWs who developed
SARS N=26 p value All N=624
Potential HCW exposure to respiratory secretions
a
Non-invasive ventilation 99 (17%) 10 (38%) ,0.01 109 (17%)
High flow oxygen 106 (18%) 2 (8%) 0.29
b 108 (17%)
Mechanical ventilation 227 (38%) 9 (35%) .73 236 (38%)
HCW involvement in intubation
a
Intubation (including fiber optic intubation) 132 (22%) 12 (46%) ,0.01 144 (23%)
Suctioning before intubation 106 (18%) 7 (27%) 0.29
b 113 (18%)
Suctioning after intubation 155 (26%) 10 (38%) 0.16 165 (26%)
Manual ventilation before intubation 108 (18%) 10 (38%) 0.02
b 118 (19%)
Manual ventilation after intubation 114 (19%) 6 (23%) 0.61 120 (19%)
Procedures with potential exposure to
respiratory secretions
a
Cardiac compressions 8 (1%) 1 (4%) 0.32
b 9 (1%)
Bronchoscopy 10 (2%) 0 (0%) 0.99
b 10 (2%)
Chest physiotherapy 47 (8%) 1 (4%) 0.71
b 48 (8%)
Defibrillation 3 (1%) 1 (4%) 0.15
b 4 (1%)
Collection of sputum sample 38 (6%) 4 (15%) 0.09
b 42 (7%)
Nebulizer treatment 9 (2%) 0 (0%) 0.99
b 9 (1%)
Manipulation of oxygen mask 280 (47%) 17 (65%) 0.06 297 (48%)
Insertion of NG tube 45 (8%) 2 (8%) 0.99
b 47 (8%)
Procedures with potential exposure to stool or urine
a
Collection of stool sample 17 (3%) 2 (8%) 0.19
b 19 (3%)
Emptying urine bag or taking urine sample 137 (23%) 4 (15%) 0.37 141 (23%)
Emptying bed pan 48 (8%) 1 (4%) 0.71
b 49 (8%)
Other procedures
a
Insertion of central venous line 53 (9%) 3 (12%) 0.72
b 56 (9%)
Insertion of urinary catheter 38 (6%) 3 (12%) 0.24
b 41 (7%)
Insertion of peripheral IV access line 138 (23%) 7 (27%) 0.65 145 (23%)
Venipuncture/arterial blood gas 160 (27%) 7 (27%) 0.99 167 (27%)
Chest tube insertion 12 (2%) 0 (0%) 0.99
b 12 (2%)
ECG 98 (16%) 11 (42%) ,0.01
b 109 (17%)
Bathing a patient 133 (22%) 4 (15%) 0.41 137 (22%)
Feeding a patient 87 (15%) 1 (4%) 0.16
b 88 (14%)
Transporting a patient 93 (16%) 7 (27%) 0.17
b 100 (16%)
Taking oral temperature 71 (12%) 2 (8%) 0.76
b 73 (12%)
Administering oral medication 111 (19%) 3 (12%) 0.45
b 114 (18%)
Housekeeping activities
a
Cleaning equipment 150(25%) 7(27%) 0.83 157 (25%)
Cleaning room 81(14%) 2(8%) 0.56
b 83 (13%)
Cleaning bathroom 41(7%) 1(4%) 0.99
b 42 (7%)
Changing bedding 171(29%) 7(27%) 0.85 178 (29%)
aFor these potential risk factors, health care workers were considered exposed if they reported being in the room while the patient was receiving the therapy.
bFisher’s exact test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010717.t003
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Figure 2. Classification and regression tree analysis of risk factors for SARS transmission, not allowing patient specific covariates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010717.g002
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10717tubing, collection of sputum or stool samples, or transporting the
patient. In the multivariate GEE logistic regression model
(Table 4), the independent predictors were eye or mucous
membrane exposure to body fluids (OR=7.34, p=.001), patient
APACHE II score $20 (OR=17.05, p=.0009), patient P/F ratio
#59 (OR=8.65, p=.001), presence during ECG (OR=3.52,
p=.002), and presence during intubation OR=2.79, p=.004).
Discussion
This study is the most detailed assessment to date of the risks of
SARS acquisition associated with HCW involvement in medical
procedures, their infection control practices and the demographic
and clinical characteristics of SARS patients. [4–6,14–19]
Amongst this group of HCWs caring for SARS patients
immediately prior to and during intubation, the strongest
predictor of SARS transmission from patient to HCW was
whether or not the patient under care was a ‘‘superspreader’’.
Twenty-three of the 26 HCWs who became infected with SARS
were infected by four of 45 patients. Lack of adherence to infection
control procedures was also associated with transmission of SARS-
CoV; however, individual patient characteristics beyond super-
spreader status were not.
The substantial heterogeneity in the number of secondary
infections created by each case for many sexually transmitted and
vector-borne diseases has led to the general rule that 20% of
patients are associated with 80% of new cases. Although
heterogeneity in individual patient transmission in diseases spread
by direct contact and respiratory droplets is less well recognized, it
has been clearly described for measles [20], rubella [21,22],
Staphylococcus aureus [23], and tuberculosis [24–26], as well as for
SARS-CoV in previous publications. [1,4,27–30] Understanding
this heterogeneity is important, because modeling studies demon-
strate that the models incorporating variability in transmission
differ substantially from standard outbreak models, and, in these
models, individually–targeted interventions are much more
effective than untargeted interventions. [31,32] ‘‘Superspreading’’
appears to be a normal feature of disease transmission, and one
that must be understood if we are to effectively prevent the spread
of respiratory infection. The presence of heterogeneity in
transmission also makes the interpretation of observational cohort
data about risk factors for transmission difficult: our analysis
illustrates the substantial potential impact of confounding in such
cohorts. Observational cohort data may have very limited value
for assessing transmission of influenza unless patient transmission
heterogeneity can be taken into account.
Our findings with respect to HCW activity risk factors are
similar to those of other studies assessing HCW risks unadjusted
for patient factors, but illustrate the complexity of analyses of
cohort studies in these settings. [15–19] The factors associated
with SARS in other analyses are somewhat different, but
essentially all are related to procedures that bring workers into
proximity with a patient’s airway for prolonged periods of time, or
with unprotected faces. In keeping with data from Teleman et al.
[16] our highest estimated HCW risk in GEE models was eye or
mucous membrane exposure to body fluids (OR=7.3), while in
CART analysis, the primary HCW related risk factor was whether
or not eye protection was worn. This should not be interpreted as
meaning that conjunctival contact in particular is a primary mode
of spread of SARS CoV: when exposure to droplet spray occurs, is
it generally not possible to distinguish exposure to eyes versus
other mucous membranes. Absence of eye protection results in
exposure of facial skin, and transmission could subsequently be
from facial skin to hand to other mucous membrane. It is also
possible that absence of eye protection is a marker for reduced
adherence to other precautionary measures for which adherence is
not adequately captured by self-report.
The range of different types of healthcare providers infected
emphasizes that healthcare worker safety is not an issue limited to
one profession, or to those workers with less education or control
over their workplace situation. The finding in our study and those
of others that a relatively small amount of education was
associated with significant increases in adherence to precautions
and reductions in infection also highlights the fact that, at least in
some situations, education alone is enough to provide significant
safety benefits. [11,16] Where possible, hospital planners should
consider building plans for ‘‘just-in-time’’ training into pandemic
and outbreak responses.
CART and GEE logistic regression were complementary
techniques for identifying HCW and patient characteristics most
associated with transmission of SARS-CoV. Advantages of CART
include the ability to identify interactions between variables by
identifying specific combinations of variables which place HCWs
at higher risk of acquiring SARS, modeling of nonlinear
relationships between the dependent and independent variables,
ability to handle numerical data that is highly skewed and
categorical data with either ordinal or non-ordinal structures and
its ease of interpretation. While logistic regression models are not
as flexible in handling this variety of data, they yield odds ratios
and p values, which are useful for quantifying risk and measuring
the statistical significance of relationships between variables. The
CART analyses were comparable with logistic regression GEE
models with respect to sensitivity, specificity, and positive and
negative predictive values.
There are several limitations to this study. Although we used
patient charts to enhance recall, and validated our questionnaire
[33,34], HCW recall of various exposures may have been
imperfect due to the stress of caring for SARS patients and the
Table 4. Multivariate Generalized Estimating Equation logistic regression model of the probability of transmitting SARS from
patient to health care worker.
Parameter OR 95% CI p value
HCW’s eye/mucous membranes exposed to body fluids 7.34 (2.19, 24.52) .001
Patient APACHE II score $20 17.05 (3.20, 90.75) .009
HCW present during ECG 3.52 (1.58, 7.86) .002
HCW present during intubation 2.79 (1.40, 5.58) .004
Patient PaO2 to FiO2 ratio #59 8.65 (2.31, 32.36) .001
HCW=health care worker.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010717.t004
Risk Factors for SARS
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10717time from exposure to interview, may have been biased by HCW
outcomes, or may themselves have introduced biases if some were
more accurate or complete than others. While our assumption that
patients who were known to have infected other HCWs also
infected the three HCWs whose source of infection was unclear
had the potential to overestimate the superspreader phenomenon,
secondary analyses confirmed our findings. While we might
speculate that presence in the room during an ECG identified as a
risk factor because other variables incompletely adjusted for
duration of time in the room when a patient is deteriorating
rapidly, we do not have a satisfactory explanation for why this
variable is associated with SARS-CoV transmission. Finally, since
the greatest risk of transmission of SARS-CoV occurred in the
cohort of HCWs caring for the patient with the lowest PaO2 to
FiO2 (P/F) ratio, the superspreader effect was confounded with the
P/F ratio effect, and it is not possible to conclude that low patient
P/F ratio is associated with SARS-CoV transmission.
Although some authors have assumed that all viral respiratory
infections have the same relative modes of transmission, such that
identified risk factors and/or interventions that prevent transmis-
sion for one can be assumed to be true for others [35], it is not
clear that knowledge about risk factors for SARS coronavirus
infection can be directly applied to other diseases such as
influenza. It is clear, however, that, during the SARS outbreak,
HCW exposures to body fluids occurred frequently and adherence
to recommended precautions was often incomplete, putting
HCWs at significant risk of infection. Thus, research into the
incidence of and risk factors for influenza transmission in acute
care hospital settings, and into interventions effective in minimiz-
ing transmission, is urgently needed.
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